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Abstract This article argues that the neglect of mid-level government among public
administration scholars is regrettable because the investigation of developments within
this level of governmental could shed new light on various core themes in public
administration. In order to understand developments taking place at the local level, it is
often necessary to investigate what is going on at the mid-level. This article concludes
that public administration scholars should develop a general framework to judge the
policies and position of mid level government, investigate whether the provincial level
is the appropriate level for developing policies, conduct more independent evaluations
of processes taking place at the mid-level layer of government; and conduct
comparative research into the causal mechanisms that determine the needs for mid-
level government.
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In most countries, one or more intermediate levels of government exists between the
local level and the national level of government. These are known under various
names: Provinces (In French speaking countries), Provincia (in Spanish speaking
countries), muhfazah (in Arabic countries), Ostan (Persia/Iran), Oblast (Russian),
Regions (in many English speaking countries), Länder (f.i. Germany), Amter
(Denmark), Wilaya (Afganistan and Algeria), Voïvodships (Poland) States (US),
Concelhos (Portugal), Kraje (Czech Republic), Prefectures (Japan), Departements
(France), Riksomraden (Sweden), Suurlahoeet (Finland), Regional Councils (New
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Zealand), or Comunidades autonomas (Spain), Eparchia (Greece). Only a few
countries operate without such intermediate government (e.g. Iceland).
The functions, roles and responsibilities of these mid-level governments vary as
widely as their names. Tasks that are performed in one country by municipalities or
by national government are handled by the mid-level government in other countries.
When a country is a federation, provinces often have more authority (e.g. Canada,
Belgium, Argentina, Germany, India, Russia, UAE) while in unitary states, they are
subordinate to the national level (the majority of countries in the world). In most of
the latter countries, provinces are seen as local units, in some of the former they are
viewed as constituent autonomous areas.
As a result of these divergent names, functions, and responsibilities, the question
of how to judge mid-level government is difficult to answer. Furthermore, most
scholars in public administration either investigate local or national government
(Dowling 2003; Kahler and Lake 2003). The mid-level is seriously neglected. One
reason is that mid-level government is often looked down upon with some disdain
by scholars and by the other layers. It is viewed as a disturbing factor, which
interferes in policies that are the formal responsibility of the national or the local
level, and its added value is disputed.
No one really knows what to do with mid-level government and how to judge its
performance and its proper role. The neglect of scholarly focus on this level is
regrettable because the investigation of developments within this governmental layer
could shed new light on various core themes in public administration, such as
decentralization, intergovernmental relations, policy coordination, the budgetary
process and public management. In order to understand developments taking place at
the local level, it is often necessary to investigate what is going on at the mid-level.
This paper addresses the following questions:
& What is known about the substantial merits of mid-level government?
& Are such merits determinative for—or are there other factors explaining—the
existence, size, responsibilities and authority of mid-level government?
& What does a case study about the debate on provinces, such as that going on in
the Netherlands, show in this regard?
& What could be the contribution of public administration in this regard?
Some theoretical considerations
Provinces are unities within a nation-state, but the character of this unity is
indeterminate. It can be in terms of culture (specific dialect, customs and habits),
historical background, such as a Duchy or a county; economic development—
mainly rural or urban; or in geographical terms. However, such differences are
relative. Even within the smallest provinces in the Netherlands, for instance,
differences can be substantial (i.e. between rural and urban areas), but the cultural
differences between provinces can also be marginal. A survey of the main
distinguishing characteristic of the province in which Dutch people live revealed
that the majority of all people in all 12 provinces mentioned ‘closeless’ as the main
feature of their own province in contrast to other provinces (Peters 2007).
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“Province” comes from the Roman Empire in which an area on behalf of (‘pro’)
the central government of the empire is controlled (‘vincere’). The classic origin still
has an impact nowadays because provinces are often associated as areas outside the
capital city, which are administratively controlled on behalf of the national
government. In some countries, the capital city still is a separate entity next to the
provinces (Belgium, Romania).
One would expect provinces therefore to be smaller than national states. This is
self-evident, but if one looks at the largest provinces in the world namely Xingjian in
China (1,660,000 km2) and Quebec in Canada (1,542,056 km2) they comprise an
area larger than that of many countries (cf. The Netherlands 41,526 km2, France
674,843 km2 or even Peru 1,285,220 km2).
The classic idea about provinces still affects its present day position in unitary
states. Its main function is to steer and control developments within the region on
behalf of central government because the national state is too large to be controlled
from the capital. This also provides the origin of the disputes between local
government and provincial government. The former want to develop policies
autonomously, but provinces are always involved, and they control and coordinate
local developments. In The Netherlands, for instance, municipal budgets are
controlled by the provinces, the responsibility over many policy areas is divided
among local, provincial and national government, and when conflicts occur within or
between municipalities, provinces are the first to try to coordinate.
From a positive point of view, provincial governments assist national as well as
local governments. They assist national government because they sometimes control
regions that are geographically distant from the capital and assist (especially small)
local governments that are unable to develop the policies required by law on their own
because they lack the expertise. Small localities often have problems in hiring
specialized personnel, which is nevertheless required in order to give permits, control
pollution, and to conduct safety controls. In such cases provinces can help out.
A second merit of provinces is related to so-called spill-over effects. Decisions
made in one municipality often impact the citizens in neighboring municipalities.
Frug (2000), for instance, points to the extraterritorial impact every city decision has,
and the possible inconsistency of such decisions among different municipalities, not
to mention the consistency between local and higher law affecting residents’ rights
in a negative way. In fact, there might be something like a tragedy of the commons
(cf. Ostrom 1990), concerning local government when every village wants to have it
own new housing estates, golf course, industrial area, theater and other services.
Mid-level government exists in order to coordinate and conduct the planning on a
regional level. This might prevent such inefficiencies; generate positive spill-over
effects, internalize the external effects caused by uncoordinated policies; and
increase efficiency by bringing about policy coordination. This is why many
scholars are in favor of regional governance as a way of rationalizing local
policymaking (e.g. Katz 2000; DiMento and Graymer 1991; Kresl and Gappert
1995; Jacob 1984; Schechter 1996).
Third, it is often pointed out that regional government has the advantage of the
economy of scale. By combining local policies, regional governments can reduce the
costs of service provision to the involved set of member municipalities, especially in
case of technical services, garbage disposal, water, and sewer systems.
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There are also many arguments against provincial involvement. Prud’homme
(1995) addressed the advantages of giving powers to national government as
opposed to regional government. The merits he mentions in this regard include the
possibilities to redistribute resources from richer to poorer regions, the possibility of
destructive competition between regions in order to attract investments, the
impossibility for macro economic policy if taxes were collected at the sub-national
level, the problems of what he called financial perversities, in case a higher
government level is known to take care of problems when a sub-national
government neglects the problem; the inefficiency of allocation and taxation because
of elections, the economies of scale, the level of corruption which, according to
Prud’homme might well be lower on a national than on sub-national level, the
difficulties in designing a good transfer system between governmental levels, the
difficulties of collaboration between governmental levels, and the indeterminate
effectiveness of several instruments in that regard, like mandates, constraints,
guidelines, floors and ceilings, coordination mechanisms, contracts and so on and so
forth (Prud’homme 1995).
There are many public administration scholars favoring the subsidiarity principle
and promoting decentralization to the lowest level possible, that is, the local and not
the regional level. The advantages are often mentioned and well-known; more
efficiency, tailor-made policies, and less red tape. Furthermore, being closer to the
citizen, this would provide more opportunities for participation and citizen
empowerment, resulting in flexibility and a high potential for learning. There would
also be less redundancy in service delivery when it is based on knowledge about the
local context. However, as argued before, these arguments are often no more than
disputable hypotheses, which can be sufficiently countered by opposing claims. In
addition, the preference for decentralization or centralization shifts through time and
is dependent on the features of the existing situation (de Vries 2000). Furthermore,
decentralization, as well as centralization, can have very different effects in different
circumstances (Andrews and de Vries 2007).
The merits of the position of provinces in relation to municipalities as presented
above only apply if local governments are willing to give up some of their authority
and responsibilities. Such a willingness among local governments is unlikely given
the suspicion about the motives of provinces’ actions—do the actions benefit local
government as well or only the provinces and/or the national government? This lack
of inclination can be explained further because the division of power between
governmental layers can be characterized as a zero sum power game, in which more
powers to one level by definition implies less powers for at least one of the other
levels. The idea that the local level would be willing to share its powers and
responsibilities is based on the assumption of congruent interests among local,
provincial and national levels. This assumption is at least disputable. This implies
that the different notions about the desired position of the provinces might be more
dependent on strategic issues than on rational considerations.
The varying size, functions and responsibilities of, and the distinct views thereon
highlight the indeterminate position of mid-level government. Questions arise about
the optimal scale of a territory in order to capture economies of scale, reduce spill-
over effects and help local governments. The question can be posed whether there
should be a mid-level government and whether developments within provinces, e.g.
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mergers among municipalities, and developments in the context of provinces, e.g.
globalization, have reduced or increased the need for a mid-level government.
The answer to this question might also depend on other factors. One can point to
the size of countries, the distance between center and periphery and difficulties of
communication among them, the heterogeneity of countries, the average size of
municipalities, the variance in the severity of problems, the composition of regional
economies and cultural diversity, that would determine whether an intermediate level
with more or less tasks, responsibilities and authority between the national and local
level is needed.
As sound as this may look from a rational point of view, the argument lacks
explanatory power in practice. Given the huge variation in size, functions, powers
and responsibilities of the provincial level in different countries, there seem to be
other reasons than rational ones for specific arrangements. It is remarkable that in
many countries, the number of provinces has remained the same despite significant
changes in the context and within their territory. Third and fourth level governments
are even found in the smallest countries and neither changes in the average size of
municipalities nor the other factors mentioned have affected the position of the mid-
level governments up to now. To give just one example, the factors mentioned in the
literature cannot explain why, for instance, Gabon has more provinces than South
Africa, or why very distinct countries like The Netherlands, Rwanda and Uzbekistan
have the same number of provinces.
An international comparison of the position of provinces, points to the predominance
of politico-historical factors, path dependencies and institutional resilience as the more
important factors explaining the number and size of such governments.
This concise discussion results in the research question: What is the weight of
rational considerations compared to politico-historical factors in the explanation of
the existence of provinces as such, their size, powers and responsibilities?
Unfortunately, I was unable to find the answer to this question in the existing
literature. In the huge bulk of the literature on good governance (as promoted by the
World Bank, IMF, and UNDP), entrepreneurial governance (Osborne and Gaebler
1992), competitive governance, enabling governance, and participatory governance
(for an overview see among others Guy Peters 1996, or Denhart 2002), the role of
mid-level government is neglected.
In the alternative conceptualization of sound governance (Farazmand 2004),
dimensions of sound governance could well be used to examine and explain the
varying role of mid-level government in different countries, e.g. process, structure,
cognition and values, constitution, organization and institution, management and
performance, policy, sector, international and globalization forces, and ethics,
accountability and transparency (Farazmand 2004, p. 13 ff). With regard to
organization and institution, he asks how well these organizations operate in
coordination with other institutions of government (Farazmand 2004) and he states
that institutions without sound organization are fragile and doomed to failure since
they cannot perform and do what they have been created to do. This failure also leads
to policy failures, structural failures, and process failures of the governance system;
hence to unsound governance (p. 15). This could well be the explanation for the
fragile position of mid-level government in many countries. While Farazmand
mentions that the issue of sound governance includes local, national, regional and
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international governance as well as global levels (Farazmand 2004: p. 14), the
discussion of governance on the mid-level is restricted to the innovations taking place
in intergovernmental relations in the USA (see the chapter by Nice and Grosse in
Farazmand 2004). The attention in the remainder of the book is focused especially on
local and national governance.
The case: intergovernmental relations in The Netherlands
To illustrate the importance of mid-level government in intergovernmental relations,
this section presents the example of the changing position of the provinces in The
Netherlands. At one time, the provinces made up the most powerful governmental
layer (see de Vries 2004). Their position has declined over the years and recently the
position of provinces in The Netherlands has come under pressure. Very low turn-
outs at provincial elections, their invisibility among the public, their ambitions that
stretch far beyond their responsibilities as provided in law, the suspicion about their
motives by the local and national levels, and the increasingly dominant idea that they
are a redundant level of government have made the province the least popular
governmental organization.
This debate seems to have entered a new phase with the national government that
was formed in 2007. Now the first signs of a coalition between national and local
government against the provincial level are visible. As early as 2006, the Dutch
Association of Municipalities wrote a letter to the Home Secretary pleading for
lessening the role of the provinces in those policies in which other governmental
layers are primarily responsible. The provinces were not amused and have since
suspended all contacts with the municipalities and their association.
The newly established (March 2007) national government, i.e. the Home
Secretary, with a minister of the interior, who was previously a mayor of one of
the larger cities, urged the provinces to restrain themselves in developing new
policies. She told them to do only those things they are required to do by law and to
refrain from all of those policy areas in which other governmental layers have prime
responsibility. The new coalition agreement reads, rather neutrally but still clearly:
“The coalition intends to diminish the administrative crowdedness. This is possible
by reducing the number of governmental layers involved in certain policy areas to a
maximum of two” (Coalition Agreement, May, 2007).
While writing this article, the first hostile reactions towards the Home Secretary
appeared. The status and money involved, the vested interests, and the criticism from
national government have irritated the elected provincial deputies. One of them said:
‘the existence and rights of provinces are undisputed… The question is: Should there
be a Minister of Neighborhoods?… She should not interfere in affairs which are
conducted by Provinces within the margins of the law’ (Gelderlander, Gazette, July,
14th 2007).
Formally he was right. By law the responsibility to manage and govern developments
within the province is left to the provincial government itself. Provinces are allowed to
develop any plans they desire for the benefit of the inhabitants living in their territory.
However, there are only a few specific tasks for which provinces have the prime
responsibility by law. Examples are tasks with regard to the control of municipal
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finances, technical tasks related to water management, provincial roads, public space,
the environment, and some minor tasks concerning for instance, ambulances, youth care
and juvenile institutions.
Notwithstanding this minor position, Dutch provinces have always developed
policies in policy areas where they don’t have any responsibilities. This has been done
in policy areas such as economic development, housing, welfare, culture, health care,
sports, and poverty, by which they try to steer, alter, redirect and in general standardize
municipal policies, and induce local authorities to conduct experiments and pilots
(Peters 2007a, b). This is the main reason why the provinces are accused by the
municipalities of unwanted interference instead of involvement, and for complicating,
duplicating, and standardizing instead of coordinating the local policies.
The case study presented below addresses this conflict and tries to describe and
explain it within the main research question stated above. First, we give a concise
overview of the situation in the Netherlands. Next we address the main actors, their
position towards the provinces and their arguments, and finally we analyze these
arguments and conclude whether they are predominantly rational or political in nature.
Some background information
The Dutch state calls itself a decentralized unitary state. It has approximately 16
million inhabitants, 12 provinces and 458 municipalities. The number of
municipalities has diminished substantially as a result of consolidations. The
reduction can be seen in Table 1.
Especially after 1960, the number of municipalities decreased at an accelerated rate
to about half the previous number. At present, there are plans to reduce the number
even more toward approximately 250 municipalities, with the goal of developing
larger, better equipped municipalities, each having at least 30,000 inhabitants.
The number of provinces has not changed significantly over the years. In 1986,
the province of Flevoland was added as a result of land reclamation from the sea. As
for the other provinces, they have existed for approximately 500 years. At one
(glorious) time (seventeenth and eighteenth century), they were the most powerful
institutions in The Netherlands. They collected their own taxes, they had their own
currency, had veto power in national decision making, and they ruled the
Year Number Decrease (%)
1900 1,121 –
1910 1,121 –
1920 1,110 1
1930 1,078 3
1940 1,054 2
1950 1,015 4
1960 994 2
1970 913 8
1980 811 11
1990 672 17
2000 504 25
2007 458 10 (in
7 years)
Table 1 The reduction of mu-
nicipalities in The Netherlands
Source: own research, partly
based on Boogers 2000
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Netherlands in a similar way as the member states in the European Union nowadays
make decisions in the EU (See de Vries 2004). After the French occupation in the
early nineteenth century, the establishment of the Kingdom of The Netherlands in
1815, and the acceptance of the Constitution in 1848, the role of the provinces
became the polar opposite of what they once were, that is, they became the weakest
level (see de Vries 2004). The national and local government viewed the provinces
with fear that they would once again become powerful, and most of the
responsibilities and powers were concentrated in the hands of the nation-state and
the municipalities. Since then, little has changed for the provinces and they obtained
very few new responsibilities even though the huge changes were visible in the
public sector as a whole, and the large increase of public expenditures in general.
Total governmental expenditures is nowadays about 110 billion euros (excluding
social transfers and care), of which about half is spent by municipalities and only 5%
by the provinces. Both municipalities and provinces receive about 80% of the
finances they need from the national government through general or specific grants.
The sub-national levels are barely able to collect taxes on their own and are almost
completely dependent on national government for their income. The figures are
presented in Table 2.
It is clear that the bulk of the public expenditures is at the national and local
levels. In fact, one can say that The Netherlands has developed into what is called a
dual state, with only a very minor position for the intermediate level, i.e. the
provinces.
The participants in the debate about the provinces
In The Netherlands several actors are involved in the debate about the appropriate
role of the provinces. These actors include the provinces themselves and the national
association of provinces (IPO), the municipalities and the Dutch association of
municipalities (VNG), the National government and especially the Home secretary
(Biza), the EU, especially the committee of the Regions and the Council of Europe,
and a number of public administration scholars, writing about the provinces, often
by commissioned for one of the above actors. Because it is impossible to address all
the publications on this issue, we focus on those actors who were most involved in
the discussion.
First there is IPO. The goal of this organization is to improve the conditions under
which provinces act and the stimulation of innovation at the provincial level. IPO is
the interest group of the 12 provinces (IPO 2006a: 5). The organization aims for a
Table 2 Public expenditures in The Netherlands (Billions of euro)
2005 2006 2007
National level 92.6a 102.0a 109.5a
Provincial level 4.5 4.7 5.4
Local level 42.3 43.6 46.1
GDP 474.0 494.0 515.0
a Including transfers to sub-national government and excluding social transfers and care expenditures
(together about the same as the total public expenditures)
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strong and dominant position of provinces. The viewpoints are based on many
commissioned scholarly reports, such as that from the Geelhoed Commission (after
the first writer) and essays written by, for instance, Toonen.
The association of municipalities is the interest group acting on behalf of local
governments. This organization aims for consolidating and the strengthening the
position of its members.1 A proposal from the municipalities in 2006 described what
they would try to accomplish in the coming decade.2
At the national level the Home Secretary published a white paper that described
several scenario’s regarding mid-level government.3 The minister emphasized the need
for solving actual problems, clarity, integral administration, democratic legitimacy and
especially a reduction of administrative crowdedness. (Biza 2006a, b: 5). The previous
national government also commissioned research in this regard, that is, the De Grave
Commission who was assigned the task of making recommendations to reduce
administrative crowdedness. This commission focused on a clear separation of tasks
and responsibilities between the several governmental layers.
At the European level there are also reports on the future of the provinces (regions).
EU aims to strengthen the sub-national levels at the cost of national governments.
Reports on the subject include ‘Regional and Local Authority in Europe’ and ‘The
Regional and Local Dimensions of New Forms of Governance in Europe’. It is clear
that EU is in favor of a stronger position of mid-level government. The Council of
Europe published a report that presents arguments for the protection of local
government and guarantees financial, political and administrative independence.4
In addition to these actors, there is the Council for the Public Sector and the
Council for Financial Relations in the Public Sector that published reports on the
position of the provinces. There are also various ad hoc commissions, like those
installed by the majors of the four major cities in The Netherlands. In a report
commissioned by them, it was noted that the competitiveness of the industrial western
part of the Dutch economy is deteriorating because of what they call the viscousness
of decision-making, i.e. too many actors, interest groups and public actors. This was
followed up in a commission under former Prime Minister Kok, which pleaded for a
complete reorganization of the responsibilities and a new governmental level that
would have the authority to make decisions. Most of the recent reports emphasize the
problem of administrative crowdedness that inhibits economic development.
Opinions and arguments
This section describes the opinions of the four major players in the debate about
provinces, e.g. the Association of Municipalities, the Association of Provinces, the
national government and the EU.
1 Zie http://www.vng.nl
2 It based its opinions on a report by the scientific council “Order in Intergovernmental Relations” (1995)
and on a commissioned report by the “Commission on the Future of Local Government.” In that report the
position of local government in 2015 is explored as well as its relation to the provinces.
3 “The future of sub-national government”
4 MvT, Stukken Belgische Senaat 1999–2000, 2–214/1.
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According to the Association of Provinces, the tasks and responsibilities of
provinces should be extended from spatial issues, infrastructure and water-
management to care, education, youth, and welfare, because of the coordination
problems, the need for coherent policies and the regional dimensions of these
issues (IPO 2005: 4–5). The provinces should have a central role in managing the
quality of public administration. In their opinion, provinces should take
responsibility in the organization and management of public policy processes,
the control of public expenditures and the smooth negotiations between public and
private stakeholders. (IPO 2006b: 1). The arguments are that provinces are well-
equipped for these tasks and are, in fact, the only ones who are competent in such
matters. They form the joints in regional, societal and administrative networks.
Furthermore, the historical position, the constitutional foundation and the
democratic legitimacy of provinces justifies such an extension of tasks (IPO
2006b: 1). Provinces should not be limited in their tasks because as this
organization tells us: “in order to make differentiation possible, an open household
is crucial for provinces. It enables the right of taking initiatives, innovation and
tailor-made solutions” (IPO 2006b: 1).
The opinions of the Association of Municipalities are in sharp contrast to this
position. This organization argues for a “closed household” and a limitation of the
activities of the provinces to those tasks they are made responsible for by law. The
tasks should be limited to those explicitly given to them by national government
(VNG 2006a). This would further the decentralization of responsibilities to
municipalities, reduce administrative crowdedness, and would make the financial
powers more congruent with the actual authorities (VNG 2006b). They argue for
separating tasks and outlining the tasks among governmental layers, which are at
present too diffuse and mingled. Based on a report from the Scientific Council, they
further argue that the provinces should not have executive tasks of their own, but
should control and coordinate only those tasks conducted by municipalities that have
spill-over effects (WRR 1995: 36–37). It is the combination of coordinating and
controlling tasks on the one hand and implementing policies on their own that makes
provincial policies problematic (WRR 1995: 68).
Another point made by the Association is that provinces should not be too
involved and instead should be more prudent in their involvement with policies
developed by municipalities. The provinces are accused of pursuing their own aim
of uniformity among municipalities and limiting possibilities for tailor-made
policies and diversity between different municipalities. (Commissie Toekomst
Lokaal Bestuur van de VNG 2006: 79). The solution to the problems is that
provinces should be less ambitious and limit themselves to the tasks accorded to
them by law, i.e. spatial planning, environmental issues, water-management, land
development and strictly described control on municipal finance and inter-
municipal cooperation (Commissie Toekomst Lokaal Bestuur van de VNG 2006:
79). Social cultural themes should not be part of the provincial tasks and because
of this, the number of provinces could be significantly reduced (Commissie
Toekomst Lokaal Bestuur van de VNG 2006: 79).
At the national government level, recent proposals propose a reduction of the
number of provinces, especially in the most industrial part of the country (the West)
because of the urgent problems. It points to the administrative density in that area
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with three provinces, numerous large municipalities and many inter-municipal
arrangements, all having partial responsibility for economic development. The
problem is that all of these actors are unable to conclude discussions and come to
decisions. This is judged to be detrimental for economic development and the
international position of this region. (BIZA 2006a, b: 29–37).
Outside of this industrial area, the problems are assumed to be less urgent and
administrative rearrangements would be less vital. It is the opinion of the Home
secretary that provinces should limit themselves to oversight, developing frame-
works, and mediation because these are the only tasks other governmental layers see
as useful for them to be involved in (BIZA 2006a, b: 12).
This point of view is supported by several commissions appointed by the national
government. The argument goes like this: since the western part can increasingly be
seen as one area for working, living, recreation and economic activities, it also needs
one governmental layer to be in authority. Since this area lacks decisiveness (as a
result of the large number of actors), developments are hindered and are proceeding
too slowly. The administrative arrangement needs to be simplified (Commissie-
Burgmans 2006: 5–15). This administrative density or ‘crowdedness’ is also
mentioned by other commissions appointed by national government (e.g. the
Commissie-Kok 2007).
These commissions also refer to economies of scale. They argue that an
administrative rearrangement is necessary on the scale of the area as a whole, and
that this would support the spatial development and the economic development of
the western part of The Netherlands (Commissie-Kok 2007: 33).
Increasingly, the discussion seems to be heading toward different solutions for
different parts of the country. In the industrial West, an administrative rearrangement
is considered crucial. In the Northern, Eastern and Southern part of the country with
less complex problems and responsibilities and no conflicts of interests, a
rearrangement is seen as less necessary (ROB 2006: 11, ROB 2006: 10 and ROB
2006: 79, but see also Commission De Grave 2005: 10 and Commission Geelhoed
2002). Scale, the need for dynamics and coordination are the most important
arguments for merging provinces in the West.
The fourth layer, the European Union, and especially the Committee of the
Regions, favors a strong mid-level government in The Netherlands. Dutch regions
should, in principle, comply with the European standards. They should develop in
competitive units which, in accordance with the EU-Lisbon agreement, can manage
social and economic development. The Lisbon agreement favors decentralization
and large responsibilities for sub-national government. It also argues that uniformity
of mid-level government in EU would be advisable since this gives the opportunities
to steer those layers directly from Brussels.
An analysis of the debate and the arguments
Where one stands depends on where one sits
When analyzing the debate, it becomes clear that when one knows the position of
the actor one also knows the actor’s position. Municipalities and national
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government are very critical about the role of provinces, and the provinces
themselves and the European actors are positive about the necessity of mid-level
(regional) government.
Although there are no formal coalitions, two coalitions can be distinguished, with
opposing views about the desired tasks for mid-level government, the merging,
splitting or disbanding thereof and about uniform or distinct solutions for different
parts of the country. It is remarkable that it is not a coalition of the sub-national
levels against the national and supranational levels. That could be explained by
substantive considerations.
However, the two coalitions must rather be seen as coalitions of indirectly related
governmental levels. This can, in our view, only be explained by political reasons in
which the division of authority plays a crucial role. The European level essentially
desires less national authority whereas the national and local government benefit
from weak provinces (Fig. 1).
As for the many Dutch public administration scholars involved in the debate, their
opinions seem to vary with the level for which they do commissioned research. If they
are paid to write a report on behalf of the provinces or Europe, the conclusions and
arguments fit that coalition. If they are commissioned by municipalities or the national
government, their conclusions are congruent with the views of that coalition.
There are only few PA scholars who addressed the issue independently. To be
mentioned are Peters, who wrote a book about provinces with the catchy title “The
Pompous Administration” (in Dutch 2007) and Derksen who wrote several articles
about “the invisible layer.”
A dialogue among the deaf
Is there further evidence that the debate about the provinces is political instead of
substantial? This section addresses this question and seeks evidence in the arguments
used in the debate. The strength of arguments can be judged by the extent to which
they are consistent, have an empirical foundation and are aimed at a rebuttal of
opposite arguments. When this is not the case, we can refer to the argument as a so-
called “dialogue among the deaf” (van Eeten 1999). This is defined as “a policy
controversy that remains deadlocked for many years, even after extensive research
European 
level 
Association of 
municipalities 
Association 
of Provinces 
National 
Government 
Critical about 
provincies 
Positive about 
provinces 
Fig. 1 The two ‘coalitions’ re-
garding mid-level government
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and deliberation between stakeholders. In these controversies, stakeholders talk past
each other, advancing arguments that are each “true” on their own terms but that lead
to fundamentally different conclusions” (van Eeten 1999).
It is clear that in the debate about provinces, the arguments are inconsistent and
are not based on empirical findings nor are they related to counterarguments. Often
the arguments are based on single illustrations of a process in a specific situation.
Empirical evidence for the conclusions is completely lacking. It has already been
argued by others that the weakness of the illustrations presented in the discussion
does not allow for the strong conclusions to be drawn (RadarAdvies 2006: 23).
This goes for the arguments of municipalities who argue that they are limited by
the provinces and for the arguments of the provinces that their level is the most
appropriate to mediate, coordinate and innovate. Given the international compar-
ison presented earlier in which the size of mid-level government was shown to
vary enormously, such a statement is hard to substantiate anyway.
The arguments about administrative crowdedness, societal developments that
required upgrading administrative arrangements, economies of scale that would
support a more important role for provinces, also lack empirical support. Rhetoric to
convince others seems to be more important than evidence-based argumentation. It is
very difficult to argue that societal problems and economic developments are
structured by provincial boundaries.
With regard to consistency similar shortcomings are visible. The Association of
Provinces repeatedly mentions societal developments to argue the need for provinces.
They mention increasing mobility, climate change, and socio-cultural changes that
require a regional approach (IPO 2006b: 4). However, they fail to argue why the pro-
vincial level would be the optimal level to address these problems. If one governmental
layer exists that has remained unchanged for the last 150 years, it is the mid-level
government.
Others argue for diversity and pluriformity and simultaneously plea for less
complexity. However, as Hendriks argued, you cannot have it both ways. Pluriform
administrative arrangements imply complex, and to some degree crowded,
administrative arrangements (Hendriks et al. 2006: 10–11).
Finally, the participants rarely address each other’s arguments. This is partly the
result of different terminology. Where one participant talks about provinces in terms
of “guarding the quality of policy processes”, others use terms like “hindrance”.
Where some use “coordination” and “innovation,” others use “crowdedness” and
“administrative density.” Of the total of substantial arguments given above,
provinces use one half and the national and local authorities use the other half.
Provinces talk about historical status, democratic legitimacy, economies of scale,
assistance of local government, coordination in cases of spillover effects and
guarding the quality of policies. Local governments emphasize half-hearted
decentralization, standardization, duplication, lack of trust, the need for pluriformity,
subsidiarity and citizen empowerment. National government stresses the adminis-
trative crowdedness, the ongoing discussions without decisions. They all seem to
have different views and ideas, perceive problems differently and use rather different
arguments about improving intergovernmental relations without ever truly address-
ing one another’s arguments.
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An overall analysis of the findings
Observations of the Dutch debate
The first observation is that opinions about the provincial government are strongly
related to the position of the actor holding that opinion. The proverb ‘Where you
stand depends on where you sit’ is a well suited to describe what is going on. Actors
who are positive about the mid-level government are the European Union and the
Association of Provinces. They want to increase the powers and authority of the
provinces and grab every opportunity for accomplishing this and to prevent others
from doing the opposite. The others—municipalities and national government—just
want to diminish the powers and authority thereof.
The second observation is that the underlying rationale seems to be that within a
fixed territory, the mutual position of local, mid-level and national government can
be seen as a zero sum power game. With several layers and a fixed territory, an
increase of the powers of one, automatically results in a cost to the others. This
power game seems to dominate the discussion. The problem of the layer in the
middle is that it is under attack from two sides. Both national and local governments
are nibbling at their powers and authority, in the same way that the provinces and
EU would like to reduce national responsibilities. When a coalition between the
national and local government is established, the position of the mid-level becomes
especially weak. In The Netherlands, this is and often has been the case when the
State Secretary had a municipal background.
Mid-level government exhibits awkward behavior in desperately trying to
consolidate its position and even expand it. This is also seen in the Netherlands.
The large number of functions that provinces envision for themselves and the
number of policy areas they want to be involved in only serves to annoy the other
two layers. This deteriorates the relationship between the provinces with the other
two layers. Because of this, the provinces are not viewed as actors who make a
useful contribution to the resolution of societal problems, but as actors that duplicate,
complicate and disturb policy processes initiated by the other layers.
The third observation is that—perhaps as a consequence of all this—a rational
debate about the proper roles and functions of mid-level governments is missing, and
that any discussion that does take place can best be described as a dialogue among
the deaf. It is a debate characterized by a failure to listen or react to each other’s
arguments, even attempting to find empirical support for one’s arguments and often
an amazing inconsistency in the argument’s logic.
The fourth observation is that developments such as globalization and its
consequences for the various governmental layers are interpreted very differently by
the actors involved. Provinces see such developments as an opportunity for
themselves, whereas the national and local governments view them as developments
that make the provincial level redundant. All of this is argued by interpreting
economies of scale by all the stakeholders to their own advantage.
For every layer, the answer to the question of the optimal scale for developing
policies is different, and given the above, it is not surprising that the supposed
optimum often corresponds with the territory of the claimant. Municipalities argue
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that the optimum scale should not exceed the local level because of the possibilities
of public participation, the cultural differences, the differences in local problems, the
specific local historical background and the merits of tailor-made policies in terms of
efficiency and effectiveness. Provinces argue the same for their level. They
emphasize that the extraterritorial impact every city decision has, makes some
coordination necessary and that this should be the in domain of the provinces. At the
national level, economies of scale are also interpreted quite differently. In this view
provinces are either too small—in cases where they address those problems that
extend over their territories, or too large—in cases where they try to resolve
problems that could be handled by municipalities. In their opinion, very few
problems remain that coincide with the classic provincial borders and that need to be
handled at the provincial level. Problems either extend beyond provincial levels, or
are typically local problems. Problems of public space, water, urban–rural relations,
housing, economic development, poverty, health and culture could, in their view, be
much better handled by municipalities or at the national level.
The possible contribution of public administration
The presentation and analysis of the case study provides the arguments for our
hypothesis that in the discussion about mid-level government political strategy, rhetoric,
myths, prejudice, antagonism and power games dominate. The analysis demonstrates
that the discussion about the desired role, powers and authority of mid-level
administration is confounded by the position and vested interests of the discussants.
The logical solution to this problem seems to be independent research addressing
the subject. Such research might point out that there is a significant role to play for
mid-level government, but it might also conclude that it has become a redundant
layer. It might conclude that merging municipalities would be an attractive
alternative for mid-level government in light of the challenges of globalization and
internationalization, but it might also conclude that such mergers could be a best-
practice to be followed by upgrading mid-level government.
Because the study of public administration is framed within the disciplines of law,
political science, sociology and economics, with its knowledge about governmental
structures, organization and management, as well as public policy processes, it is in a
position to make a significant contribution to the understandings of the necessity of
mid-level government.
Many countries are faced with a three or four layered government and many P.A.
colleagues I meet at conferences mention the problems arising from the multilayered
structure of government. However, very little research in this field has been done so
far and most of the research that is done is conducted within the framework of
regional planning. Little research in this area is evidenced from scholars in public
administration. What could P.A. scholars add to the discussion?
& First of all, they could fill in some of the gaps in our knowledge. Independent
evaluation of the workings of mid-level government adds to our knowledge of
the merits of that layer. Especially in a comparative context, this might add to the
quality of the discussion about this type of government.
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& Second, not only could they conduct research into whether policies developed at
the mid-level are effective and efficient, but also whether this layer is the most
natural layer to conduct such policies, seen within the structure of intergovern-
mental relations.
& Third, they could focus their research on the development of a framework to
judge the policies and position of mid-level government. At present there is no
framework to judge their actions. There are no evaluations conducted within
such a framework about their actual behavior, besides those initiated by the
provinces themselves which are, to say the least, often biased.
& Fourth, they could provide comparative research into the causal mechanisms that
determine the necessity or redundancy of the provincial level—especially in
order to test hypotheses about the need of mid-level government. It might be the
case that a mid-level government is needed more in larger countries, in countries
where communication between national and local level is problematic, or in
countries where socio-cultural and socio-economic problems are more varied.
The hypotheses are there, the research into their validity is still missing.
There are many myths surrounding mid-level government, many developments
that might affect its position, and much criticism that disputes its role, power,
authority and even ‘raison d’etre.’ It might be that its malfunctioning is a major
cause for the negative image of the public sector, but it might also be the only
governmental layer that is not too far from the everyday problems, but still has
enough distance to reflect on those problems. Perhaps it is the only stable factor in
an ever changing world, or maybe it is an outlived historical aberration.
The answer to questions as these will most likely vary over countries and different
parts of world. Perhaps a mid-level government is needed more in developing
countries than in developed countries or vice versa. Perhaps there are more variables
at stake than just the level of development. The point is that it is necessary to debunk
the myths, test the claims as if they were hypotheses and ultimately develop a
framework to judge and evaluate the existing intergovernmental structures. We
advocate for the construction of a framework to evaluate when and where local,
regional and national government should take prime responsibility over policy areas
and to fill this framework with empirical findings.
This article presented the example of the discussion in The Netherlands. The
reconstruction of the debate might not be so different from the same debates taking
place in other advanced industrial countries as well as in developing countries, but
perhaps the arguments used are very different. Comparatively speaking, we simply
lack knowledge to present a fair judgment about mid-level government.
Our assumption would be that such debates are without consequence because
different opinions and interests are hardly ever resolved. Sometimes the decisions
about intergovernmental relations are concluded. In the Republic of South Africa, for
instance, in 2005, the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act was passed. It
aims to bring about coherent government, effective provision of services, monitoring
implementation of policy and legislation, and realization of national priorities. The
act tells its governments that in conducting their affairs the national government,
provincial governments and local governments must seek to achieve the object of
this Act by taking into account the circumstances, material interests and budgets of
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other governments and organs of state in other governments, when exercising their
statutory powers or performing their statutory functions. In other words, the act is
developed in order to establish procedures for the conflicts that can, and probably
did, arise between different governmental levels.
Conclusions
In this article, we addressed the debate about the proper role, functions, powers and
responsibilities of mid-level government. We began with the observation that the level
in-between the local and the national government is problematic and that its function is
indeterminate. Second, we addressed the ongoing discussion about the provinces in
the Netherlands. We argued that the opinions expressed in this discussion are mostly
based on the vested interests of the participants who are caught in a zero-sum power
game and not on substantive information. The arguments in the discussion are based
on dubious assumptions and lack an empirical foundation. They are neither consistent
nor do they address counter-arguments. Some participants emphasize administrative
crowdedness, others the needed economic development, the historic position of the
provinces and societal developments. This does not lead to a constructive debate.
When one knows the position of a participant, one also knows his opinion.
Subsequently we investigated the possible role of P.A. scholars in this debate. We
argued that these scholars can conduct independent evaluations of processes taking
place at the mid-level layer of government; investigate whether the provincial level
is the right level to develop policies to solve specific policy problems; develop a
general framework to judge the policies and position of mid level government; and
conduct comparative research into the causal mechanisms that determine the need of
mid-level government. This contribution is nearly absent.
In many countries, a governmental layer exists in between the national and local
level. In Public Administration, this layer is neglected. Most scholars are either
interested in local or national developments. In our view, the mid-level is as
important as the local and national levels because of its involvement in many policy
processes as well as for explaining the developments at the other levels.
It is expedient to improve the discussion about this governmental level by making
evidence based, valid and reliable information available. The development of a general
framework, in which all the relevant criteria to judge mid-level government are
included, could serve to push the debate in a direction in which actors with a vested
interest are forced to react to one another, base their arguments on factual information
and in which the discussion could focus on the relative weight of those criteria.
In this way we can perhaps arrive at a fair evaluation on the position of mid-level
government and see whether they are archaic and redundant institutions or have the
added value they profess to have, or…. are something in between.
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